SIX PROPOSITIONS OF BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION

by Sanjeev Sabhlok (PDF 111KB)

Proposition 1

Assuming an efficient role for government (i.e., absence of government failure) corruption could arise because the bureaucrat is not paid his marginal product.

Proposition 2

The size of the bribe is directly related to the risk of being caught, and inversely to the frequency of similar transactions. In addition, the size of the bribe is inversely related to the expected opportunism of the bribee.

Proposition 3

The level of corruption of a particular bureaucrat is a function of his own personal values or metapreferences. These values govern the choice among preferences.

Proposition 4

The extended family method to control opportunism has broken down in LDCs, leaving few institutional mechanisms to control opportunism.

Proposition 5

In most cases where government institutions are corrupt, there should have been no role for government in the first place.

Proposition 6

A strong institutional environment, in terms of setting into place sufficient institutional checks and balances on bureaucratic discretionary power, is lacking in societies with high levels of corruption.

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